

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15
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R 181002Z APR 78
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5807
INFO USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 3518

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, JO, US
SUBJECT: KING'S DISCUSSION WITH U.S. NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE GROUP

BEGIN SUMMARY: IN INFORMAL REMARKS TO U.S. NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE GROUP APRIL 17, KING GAVE GENERAL ROUNDUP OF HIS VIEWS ON CURRENT ME SITUATION AND HIS EFFORTS TO SECURE PEACE. KING POINTEDLY REPEATED HIS POSITION THAT ANY DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES MUST BE "MORE THAN REWRITING OF RESOLUTION 242". NEW ELEMENTS IN KING'S THINKING WERE SUGGESTION THAT HIS ACTIVITIES FOR ARAB SUMMIT PARTLY SUBSTITUTED FOR REAL MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACE AND WERE
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DESIGNED TO TAKE HOLD IF THAT MOVEMENT PETERED OUT ENTIRELY, AND A RELATING OF ME PROBLEMS TO WHAT HE SEES AS WORSENING WESTERN POSITION IN THE WORLD. HE ALSO CHARACTERIZED JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH SYRIA AS GOOD, BUT NOT AS CLOSE AS POST 1973 PERIOD. END SUMMARY.

1. KING HUSSEIN MET WITH NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE GROUP

APRIL 17 FOR INFORMAL DISCUSSION AND QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION ON HIS VIEWS OF CURRENT MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND PROSPECTS FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. KING, SPORTING A NEW BEARD WHICH MAKES HIM LOOK A LITTLE LIKE HIS GRANDFATHER ABDULLAH, EMPHASIZED THAT HE REMAINS WILLING TO DO ALL POSSIBLE FOR A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE, BUT AT THIS TIME WHETHER PEACE EFFORTS CAN SUCCEED DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON ISRAEL. KING SAID HE WAS CONVINCED MOST ARABS ARE NOW INTERESTED IN A JUST PEACE, BUT THAT ARABS HAD GONE AS FAR AS THEY COULD GO TO ACHIEVE IT.

2. KING SKETCHED BACKGROUND OF RESOLUTION 242, TELLING GROUP HE HAD ARGUED IN 1967 THAT ARABS SHOULD ACCEPT ITS VAGUENESS OF LANGUAGE ON THE ASSUMPTION (BASED ON U.S. AND OTHER ASSURANCES) THAT THERE WOULD BE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE 1967 WAR WITHIN SIX MONTHS WITH POSSIBLE MINOR BORDER RATIFICATIONS, KING CONTINUED THAT OVER ENSURING YEARS HE HAD TRIED VERY HARD TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WERE WILLING TO WITHDRAW FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND WILLING TO ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. THE ANSWER, EVEN BEFORE PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S ELECTION, HAD ALWAYS BEEN NEGATIVE. HE HAD NOT EVEN BEEN ABLE TO WORK OUT POST 1973 DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT FOR WEST BANK.

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3. HUSSEIN NOTED THAT SADAT'S "SURPRISING, BUT COURAGEOUS" INITIATIVE HAD BEEN PARALLELED BY TWO WORRISOME ISRAELI DEVELOPMENTS. THE FIRST WAS THAT THE 1977 ELECTIONS SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT THE ISRAELI PUBLIC PREFERRED TERRITORY TO PEACE. THE SECOND WAS CONTINUING INCREASES IN ISRAELI MILITARY STRENGTH. HE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD LONG TOLD THE ARABS THAT A STRONG ISRAEL WOULD BE A MODERATE ONE, BUT RECENT EVENTS HAVE PROVEN US WRONG. THE KING EXPLAINED THAT SADAO HAD WANTED TO MOVE QUICKLY TOWARD PEACE, AND HAD REASONABLY WANTED TO KNOW WHAT END RESULTS HE MIGHT EXPECT FROM THE ISRAELIS. THIS HAD NOT WORKED, AND KING SAID PART OF THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE ARABS DON'T KNOW WHAT THE FINAL SHAPE OF ISRAEL IS IN ISRAELI MINDS. ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS, PUBLIC STATEMENTS, AND ITS RELIANCE ON MILITARY POWER WERE, HOWEVER, NOT ENCOURAGING. IF THERE IS NO RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI QUESTION, THE AREA MAY FACE VERY DIFFICULT TIMES; THE PENDULUM MAY SWING TO A RADICAL EXTREME IF HOPE FOR A RESOLUTION IS LACKING. THE OCCUPATION OF SOUTH LEBANON WAS SIMPLY ONE MORE DISCOURAGING SIGN. THE KING POINTED OUT THAT AT ARABH SUMMITS HE HAD TRIED TO GET LEBANON LEFT OUT OF THE

ARAB-ISRAELI QUESTION AND IT WAS SAD TO SEE WHAT HAD
NOW HAPPENED.

4. IN THE FACE OF THE ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE, THE KING
NOTED HE HAD TRIED TO STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE REST OF
THE ARAB WORLD (THE ARAB SUMMIT PROPOSAL). THE ARAB
WORLD SHOULD BUILD ITS STRENGTH THROUGH DEVELOPMENT
AND BETTER COORDINATION OF RESOURCES AND PERHAPS IN
TIME THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM WOULD SHRINK TO AN
APPROPRIATE SIZE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE UNCERTAINTY WAS
A DISTURBING DIMENSION TO NATION BUILDING.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 AMMAN 3518

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

5. IN MORE PHILOSOPHICAL VEIN, THE KING, CITING EAST-
WEST MILITARY INEQUALITY IN EUROPE, INSTABILITY IN
GREECE, TURKEY, PALISTAN AND THE HORN OF AFRICA, AS WELL AS SOVIET ARM-
ING OF IRAQ AND LIBYA, EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR WESTERN POSITION AND SAID
THAT THESE DEVELOPMENTS CAUGHT ARAB WORLD IN THE MIDDLE BETWEEN SOVIET
THREAT AND ZIONISM. HE PARTICULARLY WONDERED IF SOVIET
ACTIVITIES IN ARAB WORLD WERE AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH

CONTROL OVER ARAB OIL SO VITAL TO THE ECONOMIC HEALTH OF THE WEST. THE KING SAID HE HAD NO DOUBTS THAT A JUST PEACE WAS A CLEAR OBJECTIVE OF PRESIDENT CARTER, BUT QUESTIONED WHETHER ISRAEL COULD BE PERSUADED TO MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS PEACE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT
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ANY DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE MORE THAN A REWRITING OF RESOLUTION 242; AFTER ELEVEN YEARS JORDAN HAD TO KNOW WHAT THE END RESULT OF A NEGOTIATION WOULD BE.

6. ASKED ABOUT JORDANIAN RELATIONS WITH SYRIA AND IRAQ, THE KING SAID THAT AFTER 1973 HE FELT THE LEADERSHIP IN SYRIA WAS INTERESTED IN EXAMINING THE POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE. THERE HAD BEEN FAIRLY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH SYRIA DURING AND AFTER THE LEBANESE CRISIS, INCLUDING POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS AND SOME JOINT VENTURES. HOWEVER, HE AND SYRIAN LEADERSHIP DO NOT SEE EYE-TO-EYE ON THE SITUATION CREATED BY THE SADAT INITIATIVE. IT HAD ALSO CREATED A DIFFICULT TIME FOR JORDAN, BUT SADAT'S SPEECH TO THE KNESSET DID CONTAIN, KING FELT, THE GENUINE ELEMENTS OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. KING THEREFORE SAID HE HAD TRIED TO COUNSEL RESTRAINT ON PART OF SYRIA, BUT THERE ARE AREAS OF MISTRUST IN THE RELATIONSHIP. WHILE RELATIONS ARE NOW GOOD THEY WERE NOT AS CLOSE AS IN THE POST 1973 PERIOD. IN REGARD TO IRAQ, KING WAS MORE RETICENT, CHARACTERIZING RELATIONS AS NORMAL, POINTING OUT THAT DIALOGUE ON THE ARAB SUMMIT CONTINUES. NOTING SYRIAN-IRAQI BAATHIST DIFFICULTIES, KING SIAD JORDAN TRIED TO STAY IN TOUCH WITH BOTH COUNTRIES AND AVOID THE DANGEROUS COURSE OF TAKING SIDES. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON REJECTIONISTS, KING SAID THAT IF THERE WERE ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW AND ACCEPT PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION, HE COULD NOT SEE HOW SYRIA WOULD NOT BE A PARTY TO PEACE. IT WAS LACK OF PROGRESS ON PEACE THAT CAUSED THE PROBLEM OF REJECTION.

7. ASKED FOR HIS VIEW ON RESTRICTIVE ELEMENTS OF U.S.
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ARMS TRANSFER POLICY, KING REPLIED SIMPLY THAT TOTAL PICTURE NEEDED TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. FOR ITS PART, JORDAN WAS STRUGGLING WITH THE PROBLEM OF UP-DATING ITS FORCES AND WAS "SOLDIERING ON BUT SLIPPING BACK". HE NOTED THAT

SYRIA HAD INVADED JORDAN IN 1970. HE ADDED WRYLY THAT
F-15'S IN SAUDI ARABIA DO NOT HELP JORDAN VERY MUCH GIVEN
LOW SAUDI CAPACITY TO USE THEM; FACING F-15'S ACROSS
THE RIVER WAS ANOTHER REAL DANGER. HE ENDED BY SAYING
HE WOULD NOT PRESUME TO TELL PRESIDENT CARTER HOW TO RUN
HIS ARMS SUPPLY POLICY. ASKED WHOSE SIDE HE THOUGHT
TIME IS ON IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, KING SAID HE
THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS WERE NOW PLAYING FOR TIME IN HOPE
CONDITIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD CHANGE. UNLESS THERE WERE
SOME RAPID PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE IN THE NEAR FUTURE
THERE ARE POSSIBILITIES OF ERUPTION IN ARAB WORLD.
HOWEVER, HE ADDED
THERE WAS NOT TOO MUCH HOPE THAT
THERE WOULD BE ANY POLITICAL ANSWERS SOON.
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